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ABSTRACT
Based on 14 months of fi eldwork, this paper examines the infl uence 
of social norms, individual agency, and historical contingency on the 
practice of House of Obedience (bayt al-ta‘a) in the shari‘a courts of 
the Gaza Strip. It argues that the text of Islamic family law is only 
one dimension in the administration of House of Obedience. Aspects 
concerning the wider sociopolitical context are crucial, notably the 
preeminence of the notion of family honor (sharaf), the mutually con-
stitutive relation between the shari‘a court and the community, and 
the specifi cities of court cases. As an ideological construct, the law does 
not necessarily correspond to a social milieu full of inconsistencies, op-
positions, contradictions, and tensions. Th us, the practice of law has 
always been characterized by pluralism, fl exibility, and a degree of 
ambiguity, whereas the text remains characterized by rigidity, restric-
tion, stability, and in some aspects, superfi cial clarity.
The main argument developed in this paper is that the application of the House of Obedience (bayt al-ta‘a ) provision1 does not depend 
only on the text of family law or the heritage of fiqh2 and interpretation; 
rather, contextual elements such as the sociopolitical milieu, litigants’ 
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power, and judges’ discretion are decisive. The paper further contends 
that the judiciary and extra-judicial actors in the shari‘a court do not op-
erate in separate universes; rather, they mutually constitute each other’s 
degree of influence and modes of action.
I will begin with a discussion of the relation between the shari‘a
court and the community in which the law is applied. Th is is followed 
by a review of the Qur’anic roots of the concept of marital obedience 
and its contemporary legal conceptualization. Th e paper then examines 
the historical transformation of the practice of House of Obedience 
(henceforth HoO) in the Gaza Strip. Interviews with practitioners will 
be presented and court cases discussed with special emphasis on their 
broader social context. Before concluding, the paper provides a brief 
synthesis of the fi eld data.
SHARI‘A COURTS IN PALESTINE
Shari‘a courts in historical Palestine underwent signifi cant diff erential 
transformation in the course of the twentieth century. Under the declin-
ing Ottoman Empire, they constituted a broad-based and plural institu-
tion, representing the state in social, administrative, legal, educational, 
religious, and charitable matters. However, as in many other Muslim-
majority countries, the courts’ sphere of intervention was progressively 
reduced and ultimately limited solely to the management of personal 
status issues (also known as family law). Still, as the shari‘a judiciary’s 
institutional prerogatives shrank, its eff ective sphere of jurisdiction, 
although territorially fragmented aft er 1948, widened in social terms, 
reaching beyond the towns into the countryside and then into the refu-
gee camps.
Th e relative decline of the shari‘a judiciary notwithstanding, the 
judge, as a public fi gure, may still claim a degree of moral infl uence 
that transcends the scope of his administrative and legal attributes. In 
contrast to his Ottoman predecessor, who was transferred every year to 
preclude his local involvement, he tends to be a full member of the com-
munity in and for which he applies Islamic family law. Th e implications 
of his decisions reach beyond the domain of personal status, aff ecting 
signifi cant aspects of social practice. In adjudicating, he exercises “active 
authority... in rendering legal decisions in lawsuits between kin as well 
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as the discursive authority of Islamic legal norms in setting the param-
eters for the negotiation of power and property relations between kin.” 
Th rough the judge’s arbitration, the “mutually constitutive relationship 
between kin and court [is] revealed” (Doumani 2003a, 174).
However, the centrality of court-kin ties should not lead us to un-
derestimate either the importance of networks that crosscut or overarch 
the kinship-based relations of litigants or the role of bonds of patron-
age and dependency. Th ere are several authorities or actors to whom 
individuals can turn for assistance before asking the judge to intervene. 
Th ese include individual kin, friends, neighbors, family or lineage elders, 
including makhatir (sing. mukhtar),3 extended family councils (maq‘ad, 
plur. maqa‘d), police, relations of infl uence in the Palestinian Authority 
or, of late, Hamas-dominated institutions in the Gaza Strip. In recent 
years, civil society organizations have also come to play a role in support-
ing the weak, notably by aff ording legal or material assistance to women 
and children. Equally, women’s organizations have been campaigning 
for family law reform and a more gender-neutral Islamic family law. Th is 
activism might not have changed the conduct of judges, but it has tended 
to diversify the options and strategies of women plaintiff s.4
Th e fi eldwork from which data for this paper are derived was con-
ducted during 14 months between December 2001 and February 2003, 
and was grounded in observation of the legal and social universe of the 
shari‘a courts of Gaza City.5 I combined a partly open-ended ethno-
graphic approach with semi-structured interviews with judges, lawyers, 
litigants, and court personnel. I took into account a wide spectrum of 
constraints, ranging from judges’ power to litigants’ interventions. Th e 
court is situated in its (oft en volatile) sociopolitical setting. While both 
judges and parties are actors in a shared fi eld of social relations, they ap-
proach litigation from diff erent positions of power. In studying a given 
case, I have assessed this asymmetry by following actors into the social 
networks that condition access to situational knowledge, which may 
be used publicly or suppressed so as to infl uence the course of pre-trial 
negotiations, court proceedings and, ultimately, adjudication.
Within this complex of power relations, litigants do not remain 
passive. Th eir strategies reveal multiple, sometimes hidden, motivations. 
It should be stressed that women appear in court as plaintiff s more 
frequently than as defendants (see, for example, Layish 1975; Welch-
NAHDA SHEHADA  27
man 2000; Doumani 2003b; Shehada 2005). A suit may prove to be no 
more than a legal maneuver meant to record an intrafamilial agreement 
already concluded out of court;6 it may be fi led to obtain something 
not explicitly requested from or stated to the judge;7 it may be seen as a 
last resort when all informal modes of conciliation and mediation have 
failed;8 or it may be introduced to obtain rights denied, by making a 
silenced confl ict public or simply threatening to do so.9
Islamic family law regulates marriage and divorce, and determines 
the transmission of lineage and property from generation to generation. 
Th rough the marriage contract or custody arrangements, gendered rela-
tionships are affi  rmed and consequently sustain the gender asymmetry 
in the society as a whole. In this framework, gender appears as cross-
cutting all levels and forums of negotiation and litigation linked to the 
management of personal status issues. Among Palestinians today, gender 
mediates in a salient fashion between the sphere of kinship and networks 
of proximity, not least residential, as well as shared experiences.
As the focus of this article is the HoO, I will now briefl y explore 
the roots of the concept of marital obedience and the contemporary 
legal texts applied in Gaza. Th e textual origin of the concept of marital 
obedience is found in the well-known Qur’anic verse (IV:34) which 
establishes the grounds upon which Muslim jurists founded their views 
on gender. It reads:
Men are in charge of [are guardians of/are superior to/have authority 
over] women (al-rijalu qawwamuna ‘ala al-nisa’) because God has en-
dowed one with more [because God has preferred some of them over 
others] (bi-ma faddala Allahu ba‘dahum ‘ala ba‘din) and because they 
spend of their means (wa-bi-ma anfaqu min amwalihim). Th erefore the 
righteous women are obedient, guarding in secret that which God has 
guarded. As to those from whom you fear rebellion, admonish them 
and banish them to separate beds, and beat them. Th en if they obey 
you, seek not a way against them. For God is Exalted, Great. (cited in 
Stowasser 1998, 33)
Despite their diff erences over issues related to the nature of the 
Qur’an and the methodology required to read it, medieval mufassirin
(exegetes) were in agreement regarding their tafsir of gender roles and 
relations.10 For example, paraphrasing al-Tabari (d. 923), who belonged 
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to the traditionalist school, “Th is verse is primarily concerned with the 
domestic relations between husband and wife. It legislates men’s author-
ity over their women, which entails the male’s right to discipline his 
women in order to ensure female obedience both toward God and also 
himself” (Stowasser 1998, 33). Another Islamic mufassir, Baydawi (d. 
1286?), who belonged to the rationalist school, compared men’s superi-
ority to that of rulers over their subjects. In his view, male superiority is 
justifi ed by men’s innate abilities and their acquired qualities (Stowasser 
1998, 33).
Mufassirin from both schools drew on Sura IV:34 to establish their 
conservative views on gender as exemplifi ed above in the opinions of the 
traditionalist Tabari and the rationalist Baydawi. Other mufassirin, in-
cluding Ibn Hazm and Ibn Abbas, identifi ed the conditions under which 
wives could be declared disobedient. Both stipulated that the wife’s 
obedience is related to sexual enjoyment. Th e man declares his wife’s 
disobedience only when she refuses to have sex with him (see Nashwan 
1998, 10). Al-Razi as examined by Mubarak (2004, 273) “goes so far as 
to qualify what constitutes disobedience based on mere speculation.”11
Sura IV:34, therefore, is the bottom line of the hegemonic discourse on 
gender in medieval Islam. It still constitutes the essential basis of con-
temporary conservative discourse, whether Islamist or traditionalist (for 
further details, see Stowasser 1998; Mubarak 2004).
Th e marriage institution is “textually” established on a fundamental 
balance of rights and duties: maintenance is the duty of husbands; wives, 
in return, should be obedient (see Welchman 2000). Th e rights and duties 
of each spouse have been further elaborated by Muslim jurists of diff er-
ent schools. Upon signing the marriage contract, the wife should receive 
the payments due to her (mahr and nafaqa) and, in exchange, she has to 
be obedient. One interesting observation in the jurists’ texts is that all 
schools of Islamic jurisprudence (madhahib) link the nushuz (rebellious 
act) instrumentally with its fi nancial consequence; no nafaqa is due to a 
wife declared nashiza.
Regardless of his madhhab, the man has clear rights vis-à-vis his wife: 
ta‘a (obedience), ta’dib (chastisement), and the duty of the wife to stay 
home (summarized by Samara 1987). When the equation is disturbed by 
the wife’s disobedience, chastisement is required through disciplinary ac-
tion, beginning with advice, then hajr (sexual abandonment), then beating. 
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Beating, it is advised, should not humiliate the wife; nor should it leave 
marks on her body. If the man exceeds the limits, the wife has the right 
to petition the qadi for tafriq (repudiation by judicial divorce).12
Th e adjective nushuz is derived from the noun nashz, which means 
“high place” or “high position.” Nushuz thus means that the wife is 
acting in a way that assumes she has a higher social position than that 
of her husband. It is in this regard that she is considered disobedient 
(Hashiyt Ibn ‘Abdeen 3/631, quoted in Samara 1987, 218). Th e declara-
tion of the wife as nashiza, and thus the suqut (lapse) of her nafaqa, are 
entailed by the following acts:13
1) Leaving the house without the husband’s permission. Even if 
the wife leaves the house for reasons related to worship, she will be con-
sidered nashiza if she has not fi rst received her husband’s permission. 
Leaving the house for work is considered nushuz because it is forbidden 
for reasons considered more important than work.
2) Disobedience in sexual matters; that is, when the wife does not 
surrender herself (tusallim nafsaha) to her husband sexually.
3) Th e Shafi ‘ites also consider that obedience should be continuous 
and consistent: she should obey her husband day and night. If she obeys 
at night and disobeys during the day (or vice versa), she is considered 
nashiza. Th is means that if the wife leaves the house for work during 
daytime, even if she fulfi lls her sexual duties at night, she is still con-
sidered nashiza.14
4) Refusing to accompany the husband when he travels.
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL TEXTS ON MARITAL OBEDIENCE
Despite the profound changes that Muslim-majority societies underwent 
during the twentieth century, family law reform was rather slight. Processes 
of modernization, urbanization, and education, and fundamental shift s in 
demographic patterns such as decreasing rates of fertility, polygyny, and 
early marriage, led to growing confl ict between the legal regulation of fam-
ily law and new socioeconomic realities. Th e equation of obedience and 
maintenance continues to provide the ground on which the marital relation 
is established. In this framework, complementarity is stressed, by which 
gender roles are emphasized and their spheres of activity separated (see Hig-
gins 1985; Kandiyoti 1991; Mojab 1998). Th is could be exemplifi ed by
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propositions such as: “women are created of men and for men”; 
“women are inferior to men”; “women need to be protected”; “men 
are the guardians and protectors of women”; “marriage is a contract 
of exchange”; and “male and female sexuality diff er, and the latter is 
dangerous to the social order.” (Mir-Hosseini 2004, 3)
To examine the modern legal articulation of obedience and nushuz, 
I will briefl y introduce the codifi ed Islamic family law regulating the is-
sue of marital obedience in the Gaza Strip. Article 39 of the 1954 Law of 
Family Rights (LFR)15 applied in the Gaza Strip states that “the husband 
is obliged to prepare a fully equipped maskan shar‘i [a house that meets 
the legal requirements] for his wife in a place of his choosing.” Article 
40 specifi es that,
aft er receiving her dower, the wife is obliged (mujbara) to live in the 
husband’s shar‘i house and to travel with him to any other place (bal-
da) if there is no reason for not doing so. Th e husband has to treat his 
wife well and she has to obey him in permissible (mubaha) matters.
Article 66 states that “if the wife becomes nashiza and leaves her 
husband’s house, she has no right to nafaqa during the period of her 
disobedience.”
It is remarkable that the 1954 LFR applied in Gaza does not refer 
explicitly to the sexual rights of the husband, while the Book of Personal 
Status Rulings (BPSR), which is frequently used by judges and lawyers, 
very clearly stipulates the sexual rights of the husband upon contract-
ing the marriage and paying the mahr (dower). Article 212 of the BPSR 
specifi es that “[she] should respond to him when he calls her to bed 
(yad‘uha li-l-fi rash) unless she has a shar‘i reason.”
While Article 40 of the 1954 LFR makes the wife obliged (mujbara) 
to live in her shar‘i house, Article 37 of the Jordanian Law of Personal 
Status (gazetted in 1976), applied in the West Bank, says, “Th e wife 
should live in her husband’s house.” Welchman (2000, 231–2) notes that 
the diff erence between obliged and should live is a matter of revision, 
not of translation or language. Th us it is no longer legal to oblige or 
force (ijbar) the wife to go to her husband’s house, even through police 
intervention, once a ta‘a case has been won.16
In the LFR applied in Gaza, the term obliged (tujbar) still exists. 
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However, in practice, wives are not forced to go to their shar‘i house 
when a ta‘a case is won. Th is is due to diff erences in the law applied in 
the Gaza shari‘a courts. Th e Code of Shar‘i Jurisdictions of 1965 clearly 
identifi es the limits of legal execution: Article 219 of the Code states that 
“keeping the child with his/her custodian... is compulsory (qahran [that 
is, by using force]) except in ta‘a cases; when the wife refuses to comply, 
she is considered disobedient (tu‘tabar nashiza).” Th is means that she 
will be considered nashiza but will not be forcibly taken to the HoO.
Lawyer Khalid al-Tayyib gave me an insight into why women can-
not be forced to obey the court’s order in this matter:
Th e Israelis, with their overwhelming power, could not penetrate the 
social fabric of Gaza. How then is it possible for an institution such as 
the shari‘a court to force a woman to go to her husband’s house? Th at 
is inconceivable. Th is is even beyond the judge’s comprehension. Th e 
wider social implication of such an act of force would be more dan-
gerous than executing a judgment. Article 219 is in conformity with 
the social norms of Gaza. And we should be aware that this law was 
produced by the Egyptian governor who ruled Gaza for 17 years; the 
Egyptians knew what Gaza is like.17
Th e social milieu of Gaza should indeed be taken into account. 
Gazans in general are reluctant to resolve marriage disputes in this way, 
partly because the institution of marriage is not simply a relationship 
between individuals but also a bond between extended families. An HoO 
case would be humiliating not only to the wife as an individual, but also 
to her relatives, who are usually also relatives of the husband.
I will now provide a brief exposition of the HoO cases between 1927 
and 2001, which I studied in the shari‘a court archives. Th is will be followed 
by a brief account of current legal practice. Before concluding, I will situate 
the concept of marital obedience in the contextual setting of Gaza.
SOCIOPOLITICAL TRANSFORMATION
Th e massive infl ux of refugees into the Gaza Strip aft er 1948 negatively 
and irreversibly impacted people’s social and economic life as well as legal 
practice. When Palestinians fl ed their villages and towns for the Gaza 
Strip, their economic integration and absorption was almost impossible. 
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Gaza is small, circumscribed, and isolated. It has meager resources. As 
Roy (1995, 81) points out, “with no raw materials, no mineral deposits, 
no access to markets except across 200 miles of the Sinai Desert, and 
a limited amount of land and water, the Gaza Strip off ered little eco-
nomic potential.” In 1948 and subsequent years, the Gaza Strip did not 
even have enough building stone to construct houses for the hundreds 
of thousands of refugees fl eeing their lands in the aft ermath of the war 
(81). It was only six years aft er the 1948 tragedy that tents were gradually 
replaced by poorly built camps provided by the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency (UNRWA). Dislocation aff ected not only the refugees 
but also the already impoverished indigenous population of Gaza. Th eir 
living conditions declined further aft er 1948; they became “economic 
refugees” (Roy 1995, 79). Aft er 1948, Gazans, whether indigenous or 
refugees, relied on the UNRWA to provide food, kerosene, education, 
and healthcare.
Th ese profound changes in Gaza explain why, aft er 1948, the prac-
tice of calling a wife to the HoO declined sharply. When a man can 
provide no shelter whatsoever, he is unlikely to ask a court to confi ne a 
“disobedient” wife to a legitimate house (maskan shar‘i). Th ese struc-
tural elements played a great role not only in reducing the number of 
HoO cases but also in shaping the identity, purposes, and motivations 
of applicants.
Table 1 confi rms that petitions for an HoO order were not fi led 
frequently at the Gaza City shari‘a courts during the twentieth century. 
While the total number of cases escalated sharply in 1949 (from 148 
cases in 1948 to 236 in 1949), the percentage of HoO suits initially in-
creased only slightly (by approximately 1%) and then declined radically, 
from 11.8% in 1949 to 2.4% in 1950. Th e increase in the total number 
of cases might be explained by population increase. On the eve of the 
1948 war (nakba), the population of the Gaza Strip numbered 70,000, 
but the infl ux of refugees increased it by 250,000 (Roy 1995). Most of the 
newcomers had fl ed towns and villages around Jaff a and Bir al-Saba‘ in 
the Negev.18 What is now designated as the Gaza Strip covers only 27% 
of the area of Mandate Gaza (Roy 1995). Th e sudden population increase 
in this reduced territory explains the sharp rise in the total number of 
cases. Th e subsequent decline in HoO cases, however, appears to have 
been related to the socioeconomic and political upheaval that occurred 
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in Gaza aft er the 1948 war, with refugees still living in tents because no 
housing was available. It is hard to imagine that men who were searching 
for shelter for their families would petition for an HoO order.
Between 1977 and 1987, HoO cases as a percentage of the total 
number of cases dropped from 5.5% to nil. Continuing change in so-
cioeconomic circumstances could explain this decline: the generation 
following the nakba attained formal education, people’s living condi-
tions improved, and the number of trained and employed women grew. 
UNRWA played a vital role in providing rations, education, jobs, and 
health services to the refugees, who constituted the majority of Gaza’s 
inhabitants. Th e year 1987 was politically signifi cant in the lives of Pal-
estinians: the fi rst intifada erupted and no HoO suit was registered at 
the shari‘a court.
To petition for an HoO order, the husband must be fi nancially able 
not only to own or rent a separate house with appropriate physical and 
Table 1
House of Obedience petitions fi led at Gaza City shari‘a courts, 1927–2000
Year  Cases Filed      HoO Cases                  HoO Cases as %  
                           of Cases Filed
1927                150        30     20.0%
1937                159        17     10.7%
1947                135        14     10.4%
1948                148        16     10.8%
1949                236        28     11.8%
1950                406        10       2.4%
1966                361        13       3.6%
1967                181        12       6.6%
1977                288        16       5.5%
1978                250          9       3.6%
1986                217          1       0.5%
1987                224          Nil          Nil
1996                712          4       0.6%
1997                935        10       1.1%
1998                605          7       1.1%
1999                604          3       0.4%
2000                624          7       1.1%
2001                548          4       0.7%
Source: Gaza City shari‘a court records.
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non-physical characteristics, but also to meet the fi nancial obligations 
set by the court regarding his wife. Poverty in Gaza explains the fi nding 
by Welchman (2000) that, over a four-year period, only fi ve cases were 
registered at the Gaza city shari‘a courts, compared with 17 and 20 in 
Nablus and Ramallah, respectively.
Th ese statistics also raise another question: if HoO is bound to 
disappear due to “modern” modes of conduct, why are there more 
HoO cases in Ramallah and Nablus, especially since their population is 
smaller than that of Gaza City, and the West Bank is perceived as being 
more socially sophisticated or “modern”? Th is apparent contradiction is 
probably due to oversimplifi cation of notions such as “backwardness,” 
“sophistication,” “modern,” or “traditional,” which fail to account for the 
complexities of societies. Th ere are interrelated and contextual elements 
characterizing the application of HoO across time and space, to which 
we will now turn our attention on the basis of observations recorded in 
2002–03.
LEGAL PRACTICE
Legal obligations and rights do not operate in a vacuum, but in a so-
cial world, and thus refer to a regime of power relations in which class, 
gender, and social status are of utmost importance. Once a confl ict over 
matters of obedience reaches the court, litigation takes place, but in a spe-
cifi c context and against the background of socioeconomic and political 
factors that infl uence its mode of operation as well as outcomes.
Th e shari‘a courts in Gaza are very strict regarding the suitability 
of the HoO. According to clerk Abu Khalid, who works at the Gaza City 
shari‘a courts and has frequently been appointed by judges of the court 
of fi rst instance to examine such houses,
Getting the court’s approval of the HoO is very diffi  cult.... Th e house 
should be in an area that is not remote. All equipment needed by the 
wife should be available. Th e house should be secure in terms of its 
doors and windows. If the man’s economic status is good, then the 
house should meet his standard of living.... When we do the kashf
(examination of the house), we search for the slightest reason that 
leads us to consider the house illegitimate. We can always fi nd such 
defects. Th e lack of baking fl our or of secure windows are our frequent 
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excuses.... To declare the house as not shar‘i, we sometimes hide 
behind the gloominess of the house, which is a subjective criterion 
(taqdir shakhsi).19
Th is strictness makes it diffi  cult for the man to get his wife back 
against her will. If the man does succeed in providing the house, she has 
to comply. If she fails, she is declared disobedient, but force cannot be 
used to ensure her compliance. However, there are other factors that cre-
ate pressure for her to submit. Th e status of disobedience means that the 
woman is still married but neither living with her husband nor receiving 
maintenance (nafaqa). Above all, she is not allowed to remarry because 
her marriage contract has not been dissolved. If the husband wishes to 
do so, he can maintain his wife’s status of disobedience (nashiza) for the 
duration of her life.
Although judges tend to maintain a sharp division of gender roles, 
they either avoid using the HoO provision or make it diffi  cult for the 
husband to implement it. Th ey know that when a dispute reaches the 
stage of a HoO case, the relationship has turned bitter and the man’s 
action is likely to be taken out of revenge. While the judges do not pro-
nounce on the intentions of the parties involved, they do use their dis-
cretion to determine the real reasons behind the case. Th ey also seem to 
prefer to use their judicial power to settle disputes through compromise 
and agreement.
Sometimes judges are criticized by men as being sympathetic 
toward women. Th ese critics either disparage the judges’ knowledge 
of fi qh or simply accuse them of being “powerless” vis-à-vis female liti-
gants. Th is can be seen in the following case, in which the wife’s lawyer 
won a nafaqa suit but the husband did not want to pay. Th e husband 
protested:
My wife is not in my house now, so why should I pay her nafaqa? She 
left  the house without my permission and she is now living in her 
family’s house.... She is nashiza... she does not deserve nafaqa. How 
can I pay her while she is away? I am not getting anything from her 
[referring to his sexual rights].
Th e judge outlined the basis of the judgment:
Th e woman cannot be declared disobedient without your giving her 
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her full fi nancial rights (kull huquqha al-maliyya). You have to give her 
nafaqa and complete prompt dower. If she does not come back to your 
house, then you have the right to fi le a house of obedience case here 
in the court. And if we [the court] are convinced that it is a legitimate 
(shar‘i) house, we will order her to reside there. If she refuses, then it is 
the court, only the court, not you, who declares her disobedient. Th is 
is an absolute rule that cannot be impinged upon while you still owe 
your wife nafaqa and full prompt dower.
He then pointed out the options:
Now the ball is in your court. What do you want to do? Do you want 
to solve the problem? You can do so by sending her the nafaqa and 
prompt dower you owe her; or by making a better deal, getting some 
mediators to fi nd a way to resolve your dispute. If you choose the fi rst 
route, you should remember that you will pay no less than JD 50 every 
month because your salary is 260.... Is that all right with you?
Th e husband then impugned the judge’s impartiality and knowledge of 
Islamic law:
No, that is not all right at all. I will not pay her anything as long as 
she is not in my house. I am a Muslim, I know the shari‘a, fi qh, and 
the law. What you are saying is wrong. You are rewarding her for her 
rebellious action. Th is is not Islamic.
Th e judge became upset and replied sardonically, “All right, we are 
not as knowledgeable as you are, but we will see who concludes this case.” 
He then adjourned the case to the following week. A lawyer unconnected 
with the case intervened to calm the judge down: “People speak stupidly 
due to their ignorance; please forgive them.” Th e usher ran out to warn 
the man that he was going to lose his case because of his disrespectful 
comments. Th e man returned and apologized to the judge:
Tell me, what can I do with this woman? She has made a hell of my 
life.... She sucked my blood with her endless demands and every now 
and then she brings her brothers to scold me. I want to discipline her 
(‘arrabiha) and teach her brothers a lesson.
Th e judge did not respond to the question, but merely asked the 
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man to return to court the following week.20
One of the judges with whom I interacted during my fi eldwork, 
Judge al-Karmi, believes that “men do not choose this route out of love 
and respect toward their wives,” rather, they mean “to off end and to put 
the wife’s nose down.” He told me that even if the house prepared by a 
husband is truly in conformity with legally stipulated standards (shar‘i), 
the court does not favor this “legal” method of constraint:
Forcing a woman to go to her husband’s house without her consent 
leaves a bad taste. Such an act wounds the relationship between them 
and it is unlikely that the dispute will be solved by such forceful action. 
On the contrary, it may widen the gulf between the couple and further 
embitter relations between their families.
Th is desire to favor socially accepted solutions over producing legal 
judgments informs the judge’s action.
For the house to be legitimate, Judge al-Karmi told me, it should be 
located in the same area where the family used to live; that is, if the hus-
band used to reside in Gaza City, he should not rent a house located in 
a refugee camp or a remote village. Legally, the HoO should be located 
in a neighborhood where there are neighbors, in case the wife needs 
help. In addition, no member of his natal family is allowed to live with 
her (or even to visit her) without her consent. However, she is allowed to 
invite members of her family of origin to visit her, provided they are her 
maharim.21 Further, before the man’s application is accepted, his accounts 
with respect to the wife’s fi nancial rights have to be settled. Th ese factors 
constitute the starting point for the court to accept the case; the husband 
has no right to sue if he has not paid the wife’s full dower. Th e second 
step is procedural; when the clerks examine the house, they seek even 
trivial shortcomings as reasons for rejecting it. Judge al-Karmi recalled 
several such cases:
Once we sent our clerks to examine a house. One came back with 
a report that the house was not shar‘i because it did not have dried 
okra for use in winter when there are no fresh vegetables to cook. In 
another case, the house did not have needles and thread which the 
wife might need to mend her clothes. Th ere was also a case where 
the house lacked an electric oven, which women need to bake bread. 
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Th ese are, of course, trivial issues, but we always use them to break 
the husband’s will to humble his wife. If the man has appointed an 
experienced lawyer, he will warn him about all these matters, but even 
then our experienced clerks search for any defect to make it diffi  cult 
for the husband to humiliate his wife.
If the HoO is declared legitimate, the court orders the wife to dwell 
in it. However, the judge does not force her to go to the house. As Judge 
al-Karmi said,
Shari‘a does not propose coercion. If the wife accepts [the judgment], 
then she will go there and sign before the implementation offi  cer 
(ma’mur al-tanfi th) that she agrees to dwell in the house. Th e case will 
thus be declared over. But if she refuses, the court will declare her 
disobedient (nashiza).22
Lawyers observe that HoO cases are fi led less frequently than oth-
ers. Lawyer Khalid al-Tayyib confi rmed that the complications created 
by the court discourage men from resorting to the HoO provision. Ac-
cording to him, when a man applies for an obedience order, he knows 
that he has to prepare a better-equipped house than the one where his 
wife used to live:
When things go well between the couple, the wife bears life under 
diffi  cult circumstances, such as living with her husband’s family or 
accepting his fi nancial diffi  culties; but when the court is invited to 
intervene, things change and [the new situation] may dash the man’s 
original hopes. For example, the husband should be the owner of all 
the furniture, and if he happens to use part of the furniture belonging 
to her, the judge dismisses his claim.23
Lawyers warn their male clients that the HoO is binding not only 
on the wife but also on the husband. As stated earlier, aft er the man 
prepares the HoO and the court approves it, the wife must either comply 
with the court’s decision or be declared nashiza. If she defi es the ruling, 
she is no longer entitled to nafaqa. However, she remains married. Th e 
corollary is that the man is also “imprisoned” by the court’s judgment, 
since he has to maintain the house without being able to use it. His natal 
family cannot live in it, nor can he sell it or rent it, because once the wife 
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fi nds out that the husband has violated the terms, she can immediately 
apply for nafaqa or tafriq (judicial divorce).24 Th e court will then declare 
the house illegitimate, and if the man wishes to continue he needs to go 
through the application procedures again.
Th e above description shows the gulf between the richness of social 
reality and the dryness of legal texts, which in turn generates continuous 
tensions and unresolved confl icts. People are less responsive to “fi xed” 
texts than to their concrete needs, no matter how they perceive or ar-
ticulate them—if, when, and how they decide to take them to court. 
Th e “fi xed” law itself contains areas of indeterminacy, ambiguity, and 
uncertainty. HoO is “fi xed” as an inviolable right. Yet the HoO provi-
sion, despite its alleged procedural clarity, does not clearly establish how, 
when, and why men decide to use it. Similarly, women may exploit both 
the fi xity and the indeterminacy of HoO provisions for various reasons 
and motives, as is shown by the following case.
At issue was the tendency of a wife’s brother to force his sister to 
leave her marital house whenever he had a confl ict with her husband. 
Th e husband, wife, and a lawyer then hatched a strategy to use the 
threat of an HoO petition to make the brother change his ways. Th e wife 
pointed out to her brother that if she was ordered to go to the HoO, it 
would tarnish the family’s reputation. Th e brother then let her return 
to her husband.25
A combination of threat and mediation persuaded the brother to 
send his sister back to her husband’s house. Th is innovative use of a legal 
provision was possible because not everyone was aware of the implica-
tions of legal action, particularly with regard to the HoO. Th e provision 
could neither have led to any sanction against nor aff ected the economic 
well-being of the brother or his sister. Th e brother’s decision to return 
his sister to her husband was probably also informed by the perception 
that fi ling the case would entail a “social scandal.” Th us, the HoO provi-
sion, oft en a tool of women’s oppression and humiliation, was used for 
negotiation, accommodation, and power redistribution.
Women operate within a complex matrix of relationships, where 
loyalty and attachment are subject to continuous reconfi guration. How 
and when they identify themselves with their families is contingent on 
their interests. Th ey choose to attach themselves to their brothers and 
natal families when they feel the need to counterbalance the power of 
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their husbands and in-laws. However, that does not preclude reposition-
ing. When women fi nd that their loyalties and attachments to their natal 
families are being abused to the point where their individual future is at 
risk, as in the above case, they choose to reposition and identify them-
selves with their own nuclear families (see Moors 1995).
SOCIAL ORDER AND AMBIGUITY
Th e codifi cation (taqnin) of personal status laws was a complex historical 
process involving the interplay of social, political, and religious elements, 
which necessitated the integration of oft en contradictory frames of refer-
ence. Th is process involved a strong articulation of state hegemony, on 
the one hand, and on the other, a particular recognition of the social 
change underway at the turn of the twentieth century (Botiveau 1997). 
Its intention was to transform the shari‘a into a written and binding 
law that claimed to be comprehensive, accessible, and applicable to all 
Muslim citizens. All these elements had to be cautiously projected into 
the new law. Codifi cation thus became a process of integrating diff erent 
madhahib (though inconsistently presented and legalized) as well as a 
means of exercising ijtihad.
“Obedience,” the main concept dealt with in this paper, is meant to 
maintain a social order based on gender hierarchy. For various madhahib, 
cutting maintenance and declaring the woman disobedient suffi  ced to 
control rebellious women. When the shari‘a was codifi ed, the legislators 
had to fi nd a legal avenue for complying with the gender discourse of 
the madhahib on the one hand, and compelling gender hierarchy on the 
other. In many contexts, including the West Bank, suspending mainte-
nance did not prove suffi  cient to maintain the social order. Th erefore, the 
lawmakers not only conceived the HoO provision but also established 
mechanisms of enforcement. According to Jordanian Law No. 92 of 1951, 
applied in the West Bank, the police can force a woman to comply with 
the court’s judgment. Later, in Jordanian Law of Personal Status No. 61 
of 1976, this mode of enforcement was replaced by the judge’s interven-
tion to get couples to the negotiating table, either by restoring their mar-
riage or by dissolving it. In Gaza, compelling a woman to move to her 
husband’s house is legally forbidden, but there are other enforcement 
mechanisms, to which we shall return shortly.
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Th e question thus arises as to why these legal attempts were made. 
Why do women have to be forced to return to married status or to 
divorce? Th e answer lies in the ambiguity of the status of rebellious 
women. Th e nashiza woman is neither married nor divorced. She re-
mains a wife because the marriage contract is still valid, but in reality 
she does not practice her marital life. Ambivalence is undesirable in 
any law. One of the fundamental objectives of law is to protect a given 
social order (see Griffi  ths 1992, 175), and to achieve this, the law defi nes 
and fi xes a clear-cut personal status. Th e vagueness of nushuz destabi-
lizes the social order and thus prevents the law from accomplishing its 
fundamental purpose. Th erefore, at one point force was used to ensure 
the wife’s compliance with the court order, leaving no ambiguity. Later, 
the task of resolving ambiguity was devolved to the judge. However, the 
law is founded on gender asymmetry, symbolized by the “maintenance 
versus obedience” equation. Th e legal code thus generates ambiguity 
and will continue to create such aberrations as the status of “rebellious 
woman.” Th e mechanisms for preserving gender hierarchy might be 
modifi ed, but the basic feature of asymmetrical power distribution 
will remain unaff ected as long as the law’s informing gender discourse 
obtains.
Th ere are two interrelated aspects to the ambiguous status of the 
nashiza wife: spheres of authority and gender hierarchy. When the 
husband takes the private dispute into the legal sphere, he eff ectively 
transmits his authority over his wife to the court. Th e court then acts in 
the husband’s name, demanding the wife’s submission. If she does not 
comply, the court lets the husband suspend her maintenance. While 
this process appears to increase the power of the husband, in reality 
transmitting marital rights to the court carries a cost: the husband is 
no longer able to chastise the disobedient wife and it is the court that 
has the authority to defi ne the course of action on the basis of its legal 
mandate. In other words, for the husband, delegation of the wilaya
(guardianship) to the court actually means social disempowerment. All 
his extra-legal options for action on which gender relations are based, 
however socially sanctioned, are placed in limbo. Th us, control over the 
wife’s movement, contacts, and accessibility to the public sphere are all 
removed from his sphere of authority.
Legally, the transference of wilaya from the husband to a public 
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institution implies—at least theoretically—a form of “freedom” for the 
wife from the husband’s authority. Th erefore, by her mere disobedience 
she not only gets to live away from her husband but is also liberated 
from his authority. Moreover, she continues to be independent of the 
authority of other agnates since she is still legally married and no other 
male is allowed to exercise wilaya over her.
Th e social consequence of such an exceptional personal status is 
that power and control based on gender hierarchy can no longer be 
applied, which could pose a threat to the stability of the social order. 
Because of this danger, the judge, agnates, and the husband all try to use 
various social mechanisms to avoid a declaration of nushuz.
Th is analysis leads to two interrelated questions. First, why is the 
HoO provision the only requirement that is not enforceable (by force)? 
Second, why do people resort to it infrequently? An answer to the fi rst 
question is suggested by a practicing lawyer: “Th e wider social impli-
cation of such a forcible act is more dangerous than not executing a 
judgment.” In other words, the shame attached to alien intervention, 
whatever its nature, by police or otherwise, has wider social ramifi ca-
tions than failure to preserve the force of law. Th erefore, judges discour-
age the husband from fi ling the case and thus forcing them to declare a 
woman nashiza.
Gaza is a small area. It is metaphorically depicted by its inhabitants 
as a house with thin walls: “If I cough in the north, those in the south 
will hear me” is a common expression among Gazans, describing the 
forced proximity of their relations arising from their distorted historical 
trajectory. Everyone appears to know everything about everybody else 
(and is eager to do so). It is thus not only the hamula (clan) system and 
its imposition of sanctions on its members that impel people to comply 
with socially acceptable codes of conduct. Th e whole of the Gaza Strip 
appears to be a large hamula in which inhabitants are accountable to 
each other, especially with regard to their moral reputation (sum‘a wa 
sharaf ). In times of both rest and strain, Gazans oft en say, “We lost ev-
erything and were left  with nothing but our reputation (sum‘a).” Sum‘a
and sharaf are nowhere more critical than in the fi eld of personal con-
duct. If a man’s wife is declared nashiza, she will be socially stained as 
an “unfi t woman” (mara mush mniha), but the husband will be labeled 
a weak man or not a man at all (mush zalama). In a context in which 
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reputation plays a great role in determining one’s weight in society, the 
shame attached to nushuz must be avoided.
Another dimension which needs to be highlighted is the interplay 
of social norms and values on the one hand, and the actions of judges 
on the other. Judges are not detached from the values embraced by their 
community. Not only do they share the locality of their litigants, but 
they are also well informed about “who is who” and “what is what” in 
the community and have strong contacts with community members. 
Judges’ decisions thus take into account not only the history of cases 
fi led, but also, more importantly, the potential consequences of their 
judgments on the individual litigants and the larger community behind 
them (Rosen 1989). Further, the judges’ adherence to the notion of “jus-
tice” is not informed by a desire to compensate for gender asymmetry. 
Like all members of society, they are infl uenced by the dominant gender 
discourse, which legitimizes the asymmetric division of rights and duties 
within the family. Th ey thus promote justice as long as their “just” solu-
tion neither disturbs the community’s norms nor questions the gender 
asymmetry inherent in law and social practice.
CONCLUSIONS
Th is paper has examined some legal and social issues regarding the roots 
and application of bayt al-ta‘a, with special attention to its practice in the 
shari‘a courts of Gaza. It began with a discussion of the mutually con-
stitutive relation between the shari‘a court and the community in which 
the law is applied. It then reviewed the Qur’anic roots of the concept of 
marital obedience and its interpretation by various medieval exegetes. Th e 
aim was to clarify the current law with reference to its historical source and 
to study the relation obtaining between the conceptualization of obedience 
in the gender discourse of classical exegetes and its transposition into a 
“fi xed” legal text organizing gender relations between husband and wife 
in a contemporary Muslim society. Th e paper also drew attention to the 
Law of Family Rights articles that specify when, how, and under which 
conditions a man may call his wife to the House of Obedience. A number 
of interviews and analysis of HoO cases showed that the text of the law is 
only one dimension in the administration of HoO. Aspects related to the 
wider social context, notably the pre-eminence of the notion of family 
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honor (sharaf ), historical trajectory, and the specifi cities of the cases 
appear to be crucial.
Th ere is a persistent discrepancy between the practice and the text 
of family law. Practice has undergone signifi cant change without the 
letter of the law being modifi ed. Th is paradox of text versus practice is 
likely to remain a permanent feature of the application of family law as 
long as the text and legislators only pay lip service to structural changes 
in society. Th e practice of law has always been characterized by plural-
ism, fl exibility, and a degree of ambiguity, whereas the text continues to 
be characterized by rigidity, restriction, stability, and in some aspects, 
superfi cial clarity. As law is ideologically conceptualized (Moore 1978), 
it does not necessarily correspond to a social system full of inconsisten-
cies, oppositions, contradictions, and tensions. In the shari‘a courts, as 
we have seen in this paper, complex individual and situational disparities 
emerge. Th ese indicate that social change is continuous, notwithstanding 
great variations in pace and degree (Moore 1978).
To summarize, what we see in Gaza is a combination of complex 
elements that needs to be carefully unpacked in order to understand the 
dynamics of HoO. Th ere are norms to be recognized, individual agency 
of judges and litigants, and fi nally, historical contingency related to the 
1948 tragedy, the nakba. All these elements intertwine to produce the 
particular social reality in which the shari‘a courts of Gaza operate.
NOTES
1. Bayt al-ta‘a is the house to which a wife is legally ordered to move when her 
husband wins a case of obedience against her in the shari‘a court.
2. In the scholarship on Islamic law, one fi nds many (and oft en contradic-
tory) defi nitions of fi qh and shari‘a. For example, Powers (1992, 318) points out 
that shari‘a “represents God’s plan for the proper ordering of all human activities” 
and “the narrative reports (ahadith, sing., hadith) that embody the model behavior 
(sunna) of the Prophet and his Companions.” Given that these two sources “proved 
inadequate to the needs of a dynamic and changing society, [the] remainder of 
the shari‘a was discovered by the jurists, who derived from the Qur’an and the 
hadith the solutions to new problems, challenges, and issues.” In this sense, Powers 
includes fi qh in his defi nition of shari‘a. Another contrasting view is held by Mir-
Hosseini (2007) who confi nes the shari‘a to the Revelation of God and the sayings 
of Prophet Muhammad. On the basis of reviews of Kamali (1989, 216) and Abou El 
Fadl (2001, 32–5), she argues that “the shari‘a is the ‘the way.’ Muslim belief is the 
totality of God’s will as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad. Fiqh, jurisprudence, 
literally ‘understanding,’ is the process of human endeavor to discern and extract 
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legal rules from the sacred sources of Islam: that is, the Qur’an and the Sunna (the 
practice of the Prophet, as contained in hadith, Traditions). In other words, while 
the shari‘a is sacred, eternal and universal, fi qh is human and—like any other sys-
tem of jurisprudence—mundane, temporal and local” (Mir-Hosseini 2007, 85). Th is 
is in conformity with Dupret’s distinction between shari‘a and fi qh; he makes it 
clear that “shari‘a is understood as Islamic law as revealed by God (in the Qur’an or 
Koran) through His Prophet Muhammad (Sunna or Prophetic Tradition), whereas 
fi qh is the knowledge of this Law and the body of jurisprudence that originates in 
it” (Dupret 2007, 89).
Th is paper does not engage in these debates, but endorses Mir-Hosseini’s view 
because it allows challenge to the oft en gender-biased interpretation of medieval 
jurists.
3. Literally, the “selected person.” In contemporary Palestine one must distin-
guish between makhatir designated according to the principle of locality and those 
designated on the basis of descent. Th e former act within a given quarter (hayy) on 
behalf of the shari‘a court and the civil authorities, mainly to certify that potential 
marriage partners are not related in a forbidden degree or to help the court mediate 
between spouses involved in a lawsuit or administrative procedure. Th e latter, not 
recognized by the authorities, are designated by their kin to mediate in confl icts 
within and between wider patrifocal descent groups (hamayil, sing. hamula; see 
Rothenberg 1998–99).
4. Between 1996 and 1998, the Palestinian women’s movement took the lead 
in campaigning for family law reform. Th is triggered various reactions from dif-
ferent political and social groups, which led to intense discussion of family law to 
the point that it was defi ned as the fi rst major social debate in Palestinian history. 
Th e religious establishment was eff ectively engaged in the debate but not as a mono-
lithic bloc; some of its members realized the need to remedy certain gender-based 
injustices of family law, while others viewed the women’s movement initiative in a 
negative light. In Shehada (2005), I explored in detail the diff erences between the 
ideological stances held by the various actors involved in the debate on reforming 
family law and the more practical views held by the judges of the shari‘a courts.
5. To preserve the privacy of my informants, I have used pseudonyms.
6. For example, when an agreement on mukhala‘a (mutually agreed divorce) 
is decided between the couple, the role of the court is just to render such out-of-
court agreement, legal.
7. Litigants may initiate suits to achieve goals that are only indirectly linked 
to the ostensible object of the court procedure. Mir-Hosseini (1993) and Shehada 
(2005) show, for example, that women’s claims in the shari‘a court oft en refl ect a 
dual motivation: while the manifest meaning is formal, juridical, and tailored to 
match the legal rules, there is a deeper, hidden motivation determined by individual 
circumstances.
8. Examples of such legal acts are the pleas of wives for tafriq (repudiation by 
judicial divorce) due to strife and discord (niza‘ wa shiqaq).
9. In some familial confl icts, wives approach the court to force their husband 
to pay them their “unpaid” prompt dower. But that is only to put pressure on the 
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husband to get other, perhaps non-fi nancial demands. Th ey oft en drop the case later 
without receiving their dower.
10. Mubarak (2004) examines in detail the “misogynistic” reading of Sura 
IV:34 by the classical Muslim exegetes.
11. Al-Razi writes, “nushuz could be words or action... [it is] an action, for 
example, if she used to rise when he would enter, or would rush to his command, 
or would pleasantly proceed to his bed if he touched her [intimately], and then she 
[suddenly] changed from that. Th ese would be signs that indicate her nushuz and 
disobedience” (cited in Mubarak 2004, 273).
12. Mubarak (2004, 272) points out that even when later commentators such 
as al-Razi or Ibn Kathir “tried to regulate or restrict the practice of ‘wife beating’ by 
inserting prophetic traditions that opposed it, they never challenged the paradigm 
of male supremacy that gave men the prerogative to discipline their wives.”
13. As summarized by Samara (1987, 121); also in Abu Zahra 1957 and Musa 
1958.
14. Th is view is also endorsed by Article 169 of the Book of Personal Status 
Rulings (see note 15 below) which states that the professional woman who remains 
outside her home during the day in spite of having been forbidden to do so by her 
husband (‘asathu), but remains with her husband at night, receives no nafaqa as 
long as she continues to go out.
15. It is worth noting here that shari‘a courts in the Gaza Strip rely on two 
legal references for the application of family law: Qanun huquq al-‘a’ila (Law of 
Family Rights) of 1954, issued by the Egyptian Governor-General of the Gaza Strip 
by Order Number 303 (Special Offi  cial Gazette, May 22, 1965); and Kitab al-ahkam 
al-shar‘iyya fi  al-ahwal al-shakhsiyya ‘ala madhhab al-imam Abu Hanifa (Book of 
Personal Status Rulings according to the School of Imam Abu Hanifa), compiled 
by Muhammad Qadri Pasha (1875). Th e BPSR, compiled during Ottoman times, is 
still widely used in the West Bank as well as in Gaza (Welchman 2000). In Syrian 
shari‘a courts, where I conducted fi eldwork in summer 2008, judges oft en refer to 
the BPSR when Syrian family law does not provide an adequate answer. For the 
texts of the BPSR and the LFR, see Dahduh, Muhanna, and Sisalim 1996, 2–107 
and 108–22 respectively.
16. In 1967, the Egyptian Ministry of Justice issued a decree not to force a 
woman to ta‘a (Rispler-Chaim 1992).
17. Interview with lawyer Khalid al-Tayyib in Gaza City shari‘a court, August 
2002.
18. Th e refugees were distributed among eight camps along the boundaries of 
the Gaza Strip. In 1948, there was only one shari‘a court in the Gaza Strip. In 1949, 
a new court was established in Khan Younis to serve the population in south Gaza 
(interview with Judge Muhammad Juda, February 2002).
19. Interview with Abu Khalid at Gaza City shari‘a court, July 2002.
20. Th e case was observed in the shari‘a court of Gaza City in February 2003. 
I was not present at its conclusion because my fi eldwork ended before then.
21. Maharim is the plural of mahram, a person whose degree of consanguinity 
precludes a marriage relation.
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22. Interview with Judge al-Karmi at Gaza City shari‘a court, September 
2002.
23. Interview with Khalid al-Tayyib at Gaza City shari‘a court, August 
2002.
24. A tafriq suit can be fi led if the man does not pay the nafaqa.
25. Space constraints do not allow a detailed description of the case here.
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